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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, an intensifying focus has been on increasing teachers’ salaries 
based on measurable student achievement outcomes. Funding from the Teacher Incentive 
Fund was followed in 2010 by Race to the Top grant, which has focused on using student 
achievement data to reward effective teachers. In 2010, Arizona passed legislation to 
adopt a model framework for a teacher evaluation instrument that included quantitative 
data on student achievement. School districts in Arizona needed to take a closer look at 
student achievement, teacher evaluation, and performance pay to determine if the models 
put into place accurately represent rewarding teachers for student success. This research 
was focused on determining the relationship between student achievement, teacher 
evaluation scores, and performance pay for an Arizona school district. A two-sample 
independent t-test was used to determine if a statistically significant difference existed in 
student achievement (percentages of passing and growth) on state reading scores between 
teachers awarded performance pay compared to teachers not awarded performance pay. 
In addition, correlations were conducted on overall teacher evaluation scores and each 
rubric within the teacher evaluation document with student reading achievement scores 
(percentages of passing and growth). The results of the study indicated a statistically 
significant difference on the percentage of students passing the state assessment for 
teachers who received performance pay, especially for teachers in Grades 3 through 5. 
Teachers’ reading growth scores were not statistically significant for teachers awarded 
performance pay. Data analysis found no correlation between overall teacher evaluation 
scores in either the percentages for passing reading or for growth scores. A very weak 
correlation was found within the teacher evaluation rubrics of student engagement and 
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learning climate with AIMS reading growth scores. Further longitudinal research is 
recommended and changes to current teacher evaluation procedures must also be 
discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education published A Nation 
at Risk; and for the past 30 years, America has taken a critical eye on education. Closing 
the achievement gap, quality teachers, and increased accountability all became public 
concern after A Nation at Risk reported American students were not able to compete 
globally. The public and policy makers sought increased accountability in student 
achievement with the goal to reduce the mediocrity of teaching declared in the report. 
Since the early 1900s teachers were paid based on a fixed salary schedule that awarded 
teachers for time on the job and additional education or higher degrees earned. In recent 
years, an intensifying focus has been on increasing teachers’ salaries based on 
measurable student achievement outcomes. One of the most notable reform efforts was 
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. This act focused on efforts to attract, retain, and 
reward high quality teachers with the intention of increasing student achievement. No 
Child Left Behind defined highly qualified teachers as having the following 
characteristics:  
1. Holding a bachelor's degree 
2. Possess a full state certification or licensure 
3. Being able to prove that they know each subject they teach by passing 
the applicable subject and/or grade-level assessment 
Although No Child Left Behind has been successful in identifying teachers as highly 
qualified, this did not always mean these teachers were highly effective, and oftentimes, 
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it did not result in students attaining higher achievement scores. “How the federal 
government has defined highly qualified teachers, however, is somewhat limited and 
definitely does not capture all that it means to be an effective teacher” (Amrein-
Beardsley, 2006). No Child Left Behind changed the way schools identified and selected 
highly qualified teachers, but the question about the relationships between teacher 
quality, teacher effectiveness, and student achievement still lingers.  
In 2007, the Bush administration awarded the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF Grant) 
to 34 states, districts, and other educational entities, with the goal of supporting projects 
that develop and implement performance‐based compensation systems for teachers, 
principals, and other personnel in order to increase educator effectiveness and student 
achievement (Teacher Incentive Grant, 2007). Odden and Kelly (2002) defined 
performance pay as a “reward for specific behaviors or outcomes at the individual, team, 
or organizational level” (p. 59).  
Using student achievement data to reward effective teachers was a cornerstone of 
the Obama administration’s Race to the Top grant competition in 2010 (Associated Press, 
2010). Since the inception of Race to the Top, 48 states have applied for a portion of the 
nearly four billion dollars in funding. The Center for American Progress found many 
states were struggling to implement their new teacher-evaluation systems, and most of 
the Race to the Top winners have asked to extend their timetables for completing this 
work (Crowe, 2012). The United States Department of Education has been tracking the 
performance and progress of the states that were in the first phase of applicants for Race 
to the Top. Although some states have been praised, others have faced distinct 
difficulties.  
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Statement of the Problem 
Arizona was included in Phase 3 of states to be awarded Race to the Top grant. 
As part of the grant, Arizona was required to make significant changes to teacher 
evaluation systems. In 2010, a state law was enacted to change the culture of education in 
Arizona with the goal to improve how local education agencies evaluate teachers. 
Arizona Revised Statute § 15-203(A)(38) required the Arizona State Board of Education 
to adopt and maintain a model framework for a teacher evaluation instrument that 
included quantitative data on student academic progress. Furthermore, the statute states 
that student academic progress shall account for a minimum of 33% of evaluations of 
classroom teachers. Arizona school districts began to develop their own frameworks to 
comply with legislation; the state began piloting its own model in several school districts. 
These models were implemented in many districts in order to comply with legislation, but 
analysis of the effectiveness of these models is practically non-existent. School districts 
in Arizona need to take a closer look at student achievement, teacher evaluation, and 
performance pay to determine if the models Arizona has put into place accurately 
represent rewarding teachers for student success. This research is focused on determining 
the relationship between student achievement, teacher evaluation scores, and 
performance pay.  
Purpose of Study 
In 2010, Arizona mandated that school districts change their teacher evaluation 
methods to include student achievement data. In addition, by the 2015-2016 school year 
Arizona will award teachers’ performance pay that is tied to teacher evaluations including 
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student achievement data. School districts around the state of Arizona have developed 
their own unique frameworks for the incorporation of student achievement data into 
teacher evaluations. These new evaluation frameworks will ultimately be tied to 
performance pay for teachers in Arizona; and without a careful analysis of the 
relationship involving student achievement, teacher evaluation scores, and performance 
pay, how can school districts ensure they are not awarding mediocrity?  
Cardinal Valley School District (CVSD) in the central Phoenix, Arizona is an 
urban school district with a student enrollment of 10,118. Since 2008, the district has had 
a performance pay program in place tied to teacher evaluation scores and student 
achievement. The district performance pay plan includes the following goals: 
 To make a positive impact on student achievement 
 To attract and retain quality educators 
 To promote cohesiveness and a cooperative spirit within the school community 
 To promote individual strengths and allow for individual differences 
To allow for instructional flexibility and to support instructional growth in the 
inception phase of the performance pay program, teacher participation was voluntary. 
Within the last two years, the school district of 490 teachers had 167 participants in the 
performance pay program and 323 teachers unable to receive performance pay due to 
legislative changes to the performance pay program. This created a unique situation for 
CVSD. Principals along with district leadership began to ask whether the teachers 
receiving performance pay had students with higher test scores than those teachers who 
did not receive the performance pay. In addition, did teachers with high student 
achievement scores also receive high teacher evaluation scores? As the new teacher 
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evaluation framework was implemented in the district, the question for the district was, 
Did our existing performance pay program produce higher student achievement? If our 
existing performance pay program was, in fact, successful in raising student achievement 
scores, the district’s intent was to incorporate those elements into the new teacher 
evaluation framework. The purpose of this study was to identify whether performance 
pay yielded higher student achievement and determine if a relationship between student 
achievement and teacher evaluation scores existed within CVSD. The following research 
questions served as a guide for the study. 
 Is there a significant difference between the proficiency levels of students on 
state achievement tests for teachers receiving performance pay when 
compared to teachers who do not receive performance pay? 
 Is there a significant relationship between teacher evaluation scores and 
student achievement scores on state achievement tests? 
Limitations 
There were two limitations to the research conducted. The first limitation was the 
use of the state standardized achievement test for one subject during one year within 
CVSD. The use of one year of standardized achievement data assumes student 
achievement is exclusively the outcome of teacher instruction, when this is not always the 
case in public education. The impact of interventions, tutoring, or curriculum changes are 
discussed within the findings of the study. The second limitation of the study is the use of 
only one school district. Since only one school district was the focus of the study, the 
findings only represent the population of CVSD and generalized findings outside of the 
population in this study may not be possible.  
6 
Significance of the Study 
Race to the Top was the catalyst for the new Arizona Revised Statute § 15-
203(A)(38) that required the Arizona State Board of Education to implement a model 
framework for a teacher evaluation instrument that included quantitative data on student 
academic progress. Furthermore, the statute states that student academic progress shall 
account for at least 33% of the outcomes for teacher evaluations The Arizona State Board 
of Education approved the Arizona Framework for Measuring Educator Effectiveness, 
which complied with all legal requirements of the statute while providing school districts 
with some flexibility in developing their own teacher evaluation systems. As districts 
began the work of incorporating student achievement data into teacher evaluations and 
incentivizing teacher pay,  the validity of all data involved had to be ensured. It is 
imperative for our teachers and students within Arizona that a consistent evaluation 
design be established to provide accurate ratings of teacher effectiveness as these ratings 
will determine teacher performance pay. As district and state leaders move toward 
performance pay for all teachers, these are all relevant questions for the CVSD 
superintendent and other educational leaders in Arizona.  
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CHAPTER 2 
IMPLENTATION OF PERFORMANCE PAY PROGRAM 
Chapter 2 presents the historical framework and basis for the implementation of a 
performance pay program to increase student achievement. The purpose of this study was 
to identify whether performance pay yielded higher student achievement and determine if 
a relationship between student achievement and teacher evaluation scores existed within 
Cardinal Valley School District. The first section of the literature review provides a 
historical perspective on education reform efforts centered on changing how teachers are 
compensated. The second section defines the various types of incentive-based pay and 
how they could be applied in an educational setting. The final section details the different 
performance-pay programs implemented in several states over the last decade and their 
outcomes to date.  
Teacher Compensation 
Before the discussion of why reform efforts center on changing the structure of 
teacher compensation, how teacher pay was established in the United States is presented. 
According to Spencer (2001), teaching during the 17th and 18th centuries was dominated 
by male clerics sanctioned by the church and only transitioned to a female-dominated 
profession around 150 years ago. The shift to a female workforce was due to a serious 
teacher shortage as the result of the beginning of the American Civil War (Clifford, 1989; 
Elsbree, 1939; Spencer, 2001). During the early 1800s teachers were paid on a room-and-
board basis, which was successful for the rural one-room school houses of the time 
(Protsik, 1996). The room-and-board living arrangements also allowed for careful control 
and monitoring of teacher behavior, especially the behavior of unmarried young women. 
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Young women of the time were expected to be model citizens until they married and left 
the profession. “Boarding houses, teachers’ clubs, and teacherages developed to provide 
alternate living arrangements for women teachers (Spencer, 2001 p. 807). In the late 
1800s the room-and-board salary structure was replaced by paying teachers according to 
the grade level or subject taught. For example, a male teacher in 1876 could earn $1,700 
but a woman teaching the same position could only earn $1,000. These gender gap pay 
differences became a focus during the women’s rights movement and school districts 
sought a new pay structure to rectify the issue. Springer et al. (2010a), found that 
the single salary schedule determined pay according to two criteria thought to be 
most central to teacher productivity—years of service and degree held. It leveled 
the playing field relative to the grade-based compensation model by paying 
teachers on the same metric regardless of race, gender, or grade level taught. (p. 
3) 
The teacher salary schedule found in school districts today has remained largely 
unchanged since it was created in the early 1900s. Individual teacher attributes determine 
teachers’ salaries based upon years of experience and education credits, so that a teacher 
with only two years of experience and a bachelor’s degree would earn less than a teacher 
with four years of experience and a master’s degree. The historical stepped salary 
schedule was created to encourage teachers to further their education while remaining 
employees within public education. Movement on the traditional salary schedule 
occurred annually for teachers as each year teachers obtained another year of experience. 
Given the design of the stepped salary schedule, a teacher could reach top-of-the-pay 
schedule after 15 years of service. Today, teachers' salaries in most of the United States’ 
four million public schools are based on degrees and teachers' years of experience 
(Gonring, Teske, & Jupp, 2007). The stepped salary schedule for teachers remained an 
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unchanged structure and teachers have not seen significant salary increases over the last 
decade.  
1919-20 1929-30 1939-40 1949-50 1959-60 1969-70 1979-80 1989-90 1999-2000 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Annual salary of classroom 
teachers $9,905 $17,980 $22,348 $27,546 $36,844 $49,492 $44,585 $53,541 $53,523 $53,463 $54,202 $54,055 $54,845
Historical summary of public elementary and secondary school statistics: Selected years, 1919–20 through 2008–09
Data from National Center for Education Statistics http://nces.ed.gov 
 
Figure 1. Historical summary of public elementary and secondary school statistics 
 
 
Teacher salaries began to see a slight rise in the 1980s, with the most rapid 
increase between 1981 and 1990, after the appearance of A Nation at Risk, the national 
report detailing the dire state of education in the United States (Ballou & Podgursky, 
1997). A Nation at Risk brought many changes to education in America including the 
recommendation that teachers’ salaries be “professionally competitive, market sensitive 
and performance based” (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). Since 
A Nation at Risk, major reform efforts have coupled increased student achievement with 
teachers’ salaries. 
A History of Reform Efforts 
In 1986, the Carnegie Forum on Education and the Economy created as a 
response to A Nation at Risk a publication titled A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st 
Century. The goals of A Nation Prepared defined what teachers should know and be able 
to do along with supporting the creation of valid assessments to certify teachers’ 
knowledge of their subject matter. The professionalization of teaching reform efforts 
sought to align licensing teachers for what they know and what they can do for students, 
while acknowledging that teaching is an intellectually complex practice (Conley & 
Odden, 1995). Since A Nation Prepared, more national efforts followed with goals to 
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professionalize teaching and establish high quality standards that define effective 
teaching. The National Board for Professional Teaching Standards was created as a 
response to A Nation Prepared, with a purpose of developing an assessment system that 
would certify experienced teachers at the national level to distinguish teachers whose 
expertise met or exceeded high and rigorous standards (Bradley, 1994). National Board 
certification provided teachers a framework and guidelines as they moved from novice 
teachers to experienced teachers in the profession.  
In 1989, President Bush convened The Education Summit composed of national 
political and corporate leaders, including Governor Bill Clinton. The Education Summit 
had six focused educational goals, including the improvement of academic performance 
and increased qualified teachers (Vinovskis, 1999). The Education Summit led to the 
establishment of the National Council on Education and Standards Testing with the goal 
of establishing high learning standards and assessments to ensure mastery of these 
standards by students by 2000. In 1994, the Clinton administration followed up the 1989 
Education Summit work by passing Goals 2000, which proposed voluntary participation 
in testing in fourth grade reading and eighth grade math. This was surrounded by 
controversy and ultimately dissolved due to lack of funding. By 1997, virtually all states 
had teacher examinations. But simply having higher standards for teachers and better 
qualified teachers did not yield higher student achievement. In fact, many of these 
examinations were only tests of basic skills and allowed for unlimited retakes (Ballou & 
Podgursky, 1997). These tests of teacher quality also faced opposition from teachers and 
teachers’ unions, who argued that a single test should not be the sole predictor of teacher 
effectiveness, that student success was the greatest indicator of teacher quality.  
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In 2001, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) created the most dramatic 
changes to education, adding high levels of accountability by requiring both highly 
qualified teachers and high academic expectations of students. The belief was, in this era 
of high standards and high expectations, that having a highly qualified teacher had never 
been more important. According to NCLB, the law required all teachers of core academic 
subjects in the classroom be highly qualified. Teachers were highly qualified by three 
essential criteria: (a) attaining a bachelor's degree or better in the subject taught; 
(b) obtaining full state teacher certification; and (c) demonstrating knowledge in the 
subjects taught (No Child Left Behind Act, 2001). The NCLB Act established national 
accountability for highly qualified teachers and increased proficiency learning standards 
for all students without providing increased compensation or funding. With all the 
increased demands and accountability on teachers, their compensation structure had yet 
to change. In 2001, the American Federation of Teachers adopted a resolution “that 
supports experimentation to enhance the traditional compensation schedule using 
approaches that contribute to more effective teaching and learning” (Archer, 2001).  
Since the inception of NCLB in 2001, states have focused on increasing their 
capacity to store, analyze, and report on longitudinal data for students, teachers, and 
schools. In light of improved data quality, some researchers and policymakers have 
argued that school systems should be able to estimate teachers’ ability to raise student 
achievement and use these estimates to distinguish between more and less effective 
teachers. Their argument is that using these data in personnel decisions about hiring, 
professional development, tenure, compensation, and termination may ultimately increase 
the average effectiveness of the teaching workforce (Chait & Miller, 2010). Although 
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NCLB imposed increased accountability of all students, the goal of reaching 100% 
passing for all students by 2014 was never realized.  
In 2006, both government and non-profit organizations recognized the importance 
of changing teacher compensation based upon teacher performance. In 2007, the Bush 
administration awarded the Teacher Incentive Fund Grant (TIF) to 34 states, districts, and 
other educational entities with the goal to pay teachers based on their evaluations and 
their student performance scores. The TIF Grant was designed to support projects that 
developed and implemented performance‐based compensation systems for teachers and 
principals in order to increase educator effectiveness and student achievement, as 
measured by student growth, in high‐need schools (US Department of Education, 2012). 
In 2008, The National Center on Performance Incentives reported 26 states had at least 
one initiative that tied teachers’ compensation levels to their classroom performance. 
State reports on the impact of performance pay on student achievement are discussed 
later in this chapter.  
Using student achievement growth to reward effective teachers was a cornerstone 
of the Obama administration’s Race to the Top grant competition in 2010 (Associated 
Press, 2010). Since the inception of Race to the Top, 48 states have applied for a portion 
of the nearly four billion dollars in funding. The Center for American Progress has found 
the capacity and commitment of states to implement these Race to the Top 
activities will determine success or failures and as highlighted in recent news 
reports, many states are struggling to implement their new teacher-evaluation 
systems and most of the Race to the Top winners have asked to extend their 
timetables for completing this work. (McGuinn, 2012).  
Historically, reform efforts to change teacher compensation can be grouped in 
three distinct incentive pay structures: career ladders, knowledge-and-skills-based, hard-
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to-staff subjects, and performance pay. The next section discusses the different types of 
incentive pay and how they can be applied in an educational environment.  
Incentive Pay 
Incentive pay is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “something that 
incites or has a tendency to incite to determination or action” (Merriam-Webster, 2014). 
The basic idea behind incentive pay for employees is offering additional compensation 
will motivate employees to produce higher quality work or increase production levels for 
a reward. Incentive pay is not new to education and can be found as far back as England 
in the early 1700s. Gratz (2009) found “teachers’ salaries in parts of the country were 
based on examinations of student proficiency in reading, writing, and arithmetic, though 
neither the schools nor this practice were systematic, and by 1890 the experiment ended.  
The educational employment sector does not produce widgets; you cannot simply 
offer a teacher bonus pay to teach faster or teach more students. The inputs and outputs in 
an educational organization are more complicated than in an industrial setting. However, 
this did not stop continued attempts to offer incentive pay. According to Springer (2009), 
“Efforts to reform teacher compensation policies have emerged in virtually every decade 
since the 1950s. Types of reforms can be classified into a handful of categories, including 
performance pay, knowledge- and skills-based, career ladder programs, and hard-to-staff” 
(p. 4). These new compensation systems were designed to (a) promote the ongoing 
acquisition of skills and competencies, (b) respond to the market, (c) commit to 
organizational goals, and (d) accomplish results (Crandall & Wallace, 1998; Heneman, 
Ledford, & Gresham, 2002; Lawler, 2000; Zingheim & Schuster, 2000). The various 
types of incentive pay programs in education and their timeline for implementation align 
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with the reform efforts discussed in the first section of this chapter and are defined in 
depth; the outcome of each program is discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
Career Ladders 
In early 1980, as a response to A Nation at Risk, a Task Force on Teaching was 
established with a focus on establishing an incentive pay program for teachers. Along 
with establishing a new incentive pay structure for teachers, the Task Force also called 
for radical changes in both teacher training and teacher certification (Hanushek, 1986). 
The establishment of career ladder programs was among the first to award teachers based 
on “differentiated levels of responsibility, status, and salary” (King, Swanson, & 
Sweetland, 2003, p. 413). Although specific career ladder program requirements differed 
by state, Gratz  (2009) found program included the following goals: 
 Progress on professional growth plans 
 Additional training  
 Differentiated duties  
Career ladder programs represent job-based incentives for qualified teachers to 
move into other roles in the organization. “These compensation proposals recognize the 
lack of opportunity for teachers to advance professionally, except for the few who move 
to administration” (Gratz, 2009, ch. 3). By recognizing and rewarding different job 
functions within the schools, the requirements of the Task Force were met and for the 
first time established various job classifications including master or senior teachers. For 
the majority of programs, in order to be a master teacher additional trainings had to be 
attended and many teachers became peer evaluators (Brandt, 1990). Career ladder 
programs across the United States allowed each state and each district in those states to 
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determine the inputs into their career ladder plans. National studies of the effectiveness of 
career ladder plans are not comparable, but several states have conducted their own 
analysis of the impact of career ladder programs. A study of the Missouri career ladder 
program showed only a small positive effect on math achievement and no statistically 
significant impact on reading results (Glazerman &Booker, 2008). An analysis of the 
Arizona career ladder program found districts that participated in the program did have 
higher reading, math and writing scores (Amator & Kelley, 2007). National differences 
on the different elements of career ladder programs and the management of these 
programs led to funding decreases or complete elimination of career ladder programs. 
Modifications to previous career ladder programs helped to establish the next type of 
incentive pay- knowledge-and skills-based pay.  
Knowledge-and-Skills-Based Pay 
Although career ladder programs rewarded teachers for the additional or higher 
level job functions they choose, reform efforts were still focused on rewarding higher 
level attainment of skills and knowledge. Odden and Kelley (2002) found that “teaching 
to high professional standards is informed by understanding of content, knowledge about 
learning, and knowledge about content-specific pedagogy” (p. 19). This understanding 
was the basis for the NCLB demands for highly qualified teachers. The goals of the 
reform efforts were to assure the public school teachers where highly qualified in their 
subject matter and adequately prepared for the classroom environment. The National 
Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) was established after the 1986 
Carnegie Forum on Education report to develop an assessment system that could be used 
to board certify experienced teachers whose expertise met or exceeded high and rigorous 
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standards of accomplished practice. By December 2000, there were over 9,000 NBPTS 
teachers across the country (Bradley, 1994; National Board for Professional Teaching 
Standards, 1995; National Board for Professional Teaching Standards, 1999).  
Knowledge-and skills-based pay are defined as “rewards based on completion of 
teacher activities that are related to the development of knowledge and skills linked to 
improved student outcomes, as well as demonstration of classroom mastery” (Springer, 
2001, p. 5). Obtaining National Board Certification became an elevated position for many 
teachers and school districts across the country that began to offer competitive signing 
bonuses or additional stipends for teachers holding a NBPTS certification. By 2012, 
rewarding NBPTS certified teachers was the most popular type of incentive pay.  
As seen in Table 1, the National Center for Education Statistics found that 24.5% 
of school districts rewarded NBPTS teachers some type of an incentive. Districts selected 
hard-to-staff subjects as the second choice with 19.1% providing incentives to teachers 
hired in these areas.  
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Table 1 
Percentage of Public School Districts That Used Pay Incentives for Various Reasons, By 
Selected Public School District Characteristics (2011–12) 
 
To reward teachers 
who  
have attained 
National Board for 
Professional 
Teaching Standards 
certification 
To reward 
excellence 
in teaching 
To recruit or 
retain teachers 
to teach in a 
less desirable 
location 
To recruit or 
retain teachers to 
teach in fields of 
shortage 
All public 
school 
districts 
24.5 11.3 5.6 13.5 
Note. Adapted from Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), by National Center for Education Statistics, 2012. 
Retrieved from http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/sass1112_2013311_d1n_005.asp)  
 
 
In recognition for mastery of the rigorous NBPTS certification process, teachers 
obtaining the NBPTS certification were offered additional salary addenda. The website 
for NBPTS certification showed interested applicants how much additional addenda they 
could receive once they were certified. This varies by state, but at minimum, it was an 
additional $1,000 per year (National Board,  n.d.). Some states even offered to pay fees 
for applicants to begin the process for National Board certification. Knowledge-and 
skills-based pay differed from other pay-for-performance programs because these 
programs “reward[ed] teachers for developing and using knowledge and skills described 
by external, professional standards, and identified as being valued by the school” (Odden 
& Kelley, 2002, p. 103). The impetus behind NBPTS is that the better qualified the 
teacher, the greater impact the teacher would have on student achievement.  
Recent analysis of NBPTS teachers followed the implementation of the national 
program and several studies were initiated to answer the question. The results indicated 
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that there was a small positive impact on student achievement (Cavalluzzo, 2004; 
Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Goldhaber, 2002; D. N. Harris & Sass, 2011). These 
positive gains in student achievement were enough motivation for districts to compete for 
NBPTS teachers; but as a result, many teachers did not seek employment in the country’s 
neediest districts and schools. Although providing high quality teachers to all students 
was one of the goals of NCLB and NBPTS sought to ensure their teachers met the highest 
national standards, our country still struggled to place and retain these teachers for our 
lowest performing schools and students. The need for our best nationally recognized 
teachers to be compensated when accepting a teaching job in struggling schools created 
our next incentive pay practice of hard-to-staff subjects.  
Hard-to-Staff Subjects and Schools 
Hard-to-staff subjects and schools is a market-driven incentive pay program that 
began to evolve over the last 30 years. Hard-to-staff subjects are defined as those 
subjects, typically math, science, and special education, with scarcity of applicants. In 
addition, hard-to-staff schools are identified as typically low performing, high minority, 
and greater proportion of economically disadvantaged students (Ballou & Podgursky, 
1997; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Springer, 2009). Along with the challenge of recruiting the 
most qualified teachers over the past 30 years, education has begun to face competition 
for teachers of math, sciences, and high technology sector jobs. Historically, teacher 
salaries were neither market sensitive nor market driven; by entering the teaching 
profession teachers did not expect to become millionaires. Now education faces fierce 
competition with the private sector and higher education for math and science teachers. 
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“Many districts have little difficulty in hiring elementary school teachers but face chronic 
shortages of applicants in special education, math, and science” (Springer, 2009).  
Table 2 presents data from the National Center for Education Statistics and 
demonstrates the difficulty of staffing math, sciences, and special education.  
Table 2 
National Center for Education Statistics 
 
Teaching field 
Level of difficulty filling vacancy 
Easy 
Somewhat 
difficult 
Very 
difficult 
Could not fill 
the vacancy 
General elementary 75.0 21.1 3.4 0.5 
Special education 29.0 41.7 25.7 3.5 
English/language arts 58.9 32.9 7.1 1.1 
Social studies 71.6 24.4 3.6 0.4 
Computer science 50.4 33.1 14.7 1.8 
Mathematics 33.3 37.8 25.5 3.4 
Biology or life sciences 34.8 44.2 19.1 1.9 
Physical sciences 34.6 37.7 25.3 2.4 
English as a second language 31.4 37.2 28.6 2.8 
Foreign languages 26.7 39.7 29.5 4.1 
Music or art 46.1 34.8 17.1 2.1 
Vocational or technical education 34.4 37.7 24.2 3.7 
Note. Percentages of public elementary and secondary schools with a teaching vacancy in selected teaching 
fields, by the school's reported level of difficulty in filling the vacancy, teaching field: 2003–04. 
Adapted from Race to the Top Program: Executive Summary (Schools and Staffing Survey, "Public School 
Questionnaire," 2003–04), , by U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,  
 
 
In a response to market demands, many districts have implemented hard-to-staff 
incentive pay for teachers of math, science, and special education as either a recruitment 
or a retention bonus (Springer & Gardner, 2010b). Many districts are faced with both 
hard-to-staff teaching positions within hard-to-staff schools; states have sought solutions 
to this problem. In 1998, Massachusetts State Legislature was facing a teacher shortage 
and instituted a $20,000 signing bonus to be paid over four years of consistent 
employment. Other places around the nation followed the trend with Houston offering 
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$5,000; Los Angeles with $5,000 for bilingual teachers; Dallas offered $4,500; and 
Nevada with a $2,000 signing bonus (Bryant, 2002; Ferdinand, 1998; Gewertz, 2001; 
Schemo, 2002). By offering bonuses for hard-to-staff subjects, schools assume 
compensation is what drives teachers to remain in their teaching positions. Liu, Johnson, 
and Peske (2004) found “this strategy assumes that the problem of teacher quality is 
getting smarter people to teach, and that the main reason smart people do not enter 
teaching is the low pay” (p. 222). The bonus structure sought not only to hire, but also to 
retain teachers in the hard-to-staff subjects and schools, so the question became, “Was 
this initiative successful?’  
Researchers conducted a longitudinal study of the first recipients of the $20,000 
recruitment bonus and found virtually no evidence that the bonus was effective at 
retaining teachers; teachers left for the same reasons all teachers leave the profession: site 
leadership, lack of support, and selection of another profession (S. Johnson & Birkeland, 
2003; S. M. Johnson, Kardos, Kauffman, Liu, & Donaldson, 2004; Liu et al., 2004). With 
such substantial bonuses offered to teachers, the questions then became how to identify 
and reward quality teachers, with the anticipated outcome of increased student 
achievement. The desire to classify and compensate excellent teachers to effect positive 
student achievement results drove policy makers to the most current incentive 
performance-pay. 
Performance Pay 
After the implementation of career ladders, knowledge-skills-based, hard-to-staff 
subjects and schools, performance pay is the newest evolution of incentive pay in 
education to date. In their 2002 book, Odden & Kelley defined performance pay: 
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Performance pay represents another element of pay and compensation. 
Performance pay can reward specific behaviors or outcomes at the individual, 
team, or organizational level. At the individual level, performance pay can be 
called merit pay. Performance awards are usually offered as additional pay for 
high or improved performance. (p. 59) 
Performance pay for employees in other sectors such as healthcare, business, and 
government are designed to accurately measure performance (output) and award 
accordingly (Cannon, 2007; Novicoff, 2006). Rewarding performance pay in education 
can be a complicated endeavor as the outputs of the educational system are not as 
tangible as those of the business sector. The outputs on which teachers can be assessed 
are varied, complicated, and unique to the grade level or subject taught. The challenges 
facing performance pay in education are how and which output(s) do you measure for 
educators and does pay for performance have a positive impact on student achievement 
(Kelley, Milanowski, & Heneman, 2000; Odden & Kelley, 2002; Podgursky & Springer, 
2007). Performance pay output(s) for educators can be defined as follows: 
 Individual teacher achievement scores on standardized tests 
 Group or grade level teacher achievement scores on standardized tests 
 Teacher evaluation scores (based on observational data conducted by 
administrators) 
 School level results (or ratings) based on achievement scores on standardized tests 
(Ballou & Podgursky, 1997; Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Odden & Kelley, 2002; 
Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Springer et al., 2010a). 
Colorado led the way nationally for their performance pay program which was 
supported by the union and their community, and became the model for national efforts 
funded by the United States Department of Education and private foundations.  
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Denver Professional Compensation Plan for Teachers  
Denver was one of the first states to pilot and implement a performance pay 
program called Professional Compensation Plan for Teachers (ProComp), which linked 
teachers directly to their students’ achievement. In 1999, the Denver School District 
began designing the pilot for ProComp and only one year later the performance pay 
program pilot testing began (Gonring, Teske, & Jupp, 2007). ProComp included 
components of existing incentive pay including knowledge-and-skills based along with 
hard-to-staff subjects and schools, but the most innovative portion of the plan was linking 
student achievement to the teacher and incorporating teacher evaluation as outputs for 
performance pay (Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Gonring et al., 2007; Steele, Hamilton, & 
Stecher, 2010; Wiley, Spindler, & Subert, 2010). The pioneering ProComp model used 
student growth data in an attempt to accurately measure the effect quality teachers add 
value to a student’s education. The model was created to capture the inputs into student 
success and then measure and reward those outputs (Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; D. Harris 
& Sass, 2006; Mihaly & McCaffrey, 2013; Slavin, 2008). ProComp was the first attempt 
to quantify the impact of a teacher during one year of instruction based upon a student’s 
previous academic standing and is defined as “value added.” “If achievement at a 
previous time (t*) is also observed it is possible to concentrate on value added over the 
intervening period” (Hanushek, Fildes, & Davies, 1992, p. 89). For example, if a fourth 
grade teacher has an incoming class of students that all reached 90% proficiency on their 
third grade end-of-year reading assessment and leave fourth grade at only 75% 
proficiency, did that teacher add any value to the students in the school year?  
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Value added is not without controversy. Opponents argue that the variables of 
sorting and placement of students, student mobility, class-size, and student background 
all must be studied before widespread implementation (Amrein-Beardsley, 2008; 
Goldrick, 2002; D. Harris & Sass, 2006; Koedel & Betts, 2010; Koretz, 2002). Despite 
controversy with value added calculations, the ProComp pilot results were presented and 
approved by employees, teacher unions, and the school board in 2004, with the first 
checks written to teachers in 2006. Funding for ProComp has been provided by The 
Broad Foundation, Rose Foundation, and by Denver voters, with a $25 million dollar 
annual property tax increase in 2005 (Gonring et al., 2007). With significant financial, 
union, and public support, the next question for ProComp was “Did the program have a 
positive impact on student achievement?  
Denver was faced with distinct groups of teachers to analyze as, during the 
inception, participation in ProComp was voluntary. If a teacher was employed in Denver 
prior to January 2006, involvement in ProComp was voluntary, whereas teachers hired 
after January 2006 were automatically enrolled into the performance pay program. 
Evaluations of ProComp found an increase in student achievement for both voluntary and 
non-ProComp recipients; researchers attributed this to positive changes with the entire 
educational system for all teachers (Goldhaber & Walch, 2012; Wiley et al., 2010). 
“While the findings are not completely consistent across subject and grade level, in 
general, we find increased achievement during the ProComp time period” (Goldhaber & 
Walch, 2012, p. 1077). ProComp is a successful model for the creation, implementation, 
and support of a performance pay program (Gratz, 2009). The United States Department 
of Education and private foundations watched all aspects of the ProComp implementation 
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and followed with competitive national performance pay programs, including the Teacher 
Incentive Fund.  
Teacher Incentive Fund 
Denver was one of the first successful performance pay programs able to link 
teacher evaluation scores and student achievement. The inclusion of hard-to-staff subjects 
and schools and knowledge-skills-based pay created the first comprehensive performance 
pay program. This comprehensive change to teacher compensation reflected the goals of 
multiple reform efforts since A Nation at Risk. In 2006, the United States Congress 
created a $600 million dollar federal grant program called the Teacher Incentive Fund 
(TIF) to support projects that reform teacher compensation. Gratz (2009) stated, “The 
Teacher Incentive Fund was developed as a companion to No Child Left Behind and 
focuses on rewarding teachers and schools for closing the achievement gap, raising 
student achievement, and producing real results for all children” (p. loc 3428).  
The five goals of the TIF grant were similar to the elements found in ProComp:  
 Improve student achievement by improving teacher and principal effectiveness 
 Tie teacher and principal compensation to increases in student achievement 
 Increase the number of effective teachers in hard-to-staff schools and subjects 
 Create sustainable performance pay systems 
 Examine multiple approaches to providing teacher incentives 
Thirty three TIF grants were awarded to three state educational agencies, 22 local 
education agencies and eight non-profit organizations beginning in 2006 (Humphrey, 
Gallagher, & Yee, 2012). Figure 2 demonstrates the variety of both rural and urban 
districts awarded the initial TIF grants in 2006.  
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Figure 2. Rural and urban districts awarded the initial TIF grants in 2006 
Denver applied for, and was awarded, the TIF grant for their ProComp program, 
and in fact, 23 of the 33 grantees had some previous experience with various aspects of 
performance pay. The TIF grant allowed awardees to expand their existing program or 
increase payouts for teachers. Seven of the grantees also implemented the Teacher 
Advancement Program (TAP) created by the Milken Foundation to support their TIF 
grant. TAP is “a comprehensive school reform system that provides opportunities for 
career advancement and extensive support to teachers” (Humphrey, Gallagher, & Yee, 
2012, p. 40). The first round of TIF grantees reported difficulties managing the massive 
amounts of student and teacher data to be created, tracked, and reported within the TIF 
system (McGuinn, 2012). In addition to data issues, TIF awardees found multiple 
problems using teacher evaluation data as part of a performance pay system.  
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TIF grant award winners had to shift their teacher evaluation from personnel 
driven reporting with subjective ratings to targeted instructional support and 
improvement systems, through numerous observations from well-trained administrators 
(Baker, Barton, & Darling-Hammond, 2010; Darling-Hammond, Amrein-Beardsley, 
Haertel, & Rothstein, 2012; Goldrick, 2002; McGuinn, 2012; Yeh, 2009). These 
challenges resulted in mixed student achievement results from the first round of TIF grant 
award winners and spurred changes to the TIF grant structure. These included support for 
implementation of data systems and minimum requirements for annual teacher 
observations. Additional qualitative data could now be included for the performance pay 
including parent and student surveys of teachers (Humphrey et al., 2012; McGuinn, 2012; 
US Department of Education, 2012). These modifications to TIF helped shape the largest 
federal competitive school reform grant, Race to the Top, which was a cornerstone of 
Obama administration’s education reform policy.  
Race to the Top 
In response to economic recession, President Barack Obama signed into law the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). This legislation included 
$4.35 billion dollars in competitive grant funding, or Race to the Top grant, for 
educational innovation and reform. In order to apply for Race to the Top, states had to 
match the four core educational reform areas:  
 Adopting standards and assessments that prepare students to succeed in college 
and the workplace and to compete in the global economy; 
 Building data systems that measure student growth and success, and inform 
teachers and principals about how they can improve instruction; 
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 Recruiting, developing, rewarding, and retaining effective teachers and principals, 
especially where they are needed most 
 Turning around our lowest-achieving schools (US Department of Education, 
2009, p. 2). 
Many of the requirements of Race to the Top matched the refinements made to 
the TIF grant so it was not surprising that Colorado was among the first round of grant 
winners. In March 2010, the other states joining Colorado in the first round of winners 
were Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
(Neil & Martinez, 2014). In addition to Race to the Top grant funding, many awardees 
also participated in TIF grants and Gates Foundation funded performance pay programs. 
States participated in multiple grants due to concern over the sustainability of funding for 
these various programs (Humphrey et al., 2012). In addition to sustainability concerns, 
Race to the Top faced criticism from teachers unions and researchers over the use of 
value added student growth scores and teacher evaluation scores. Despite this critique,  
Boser (2012), found some states appeared to be meeting the Race to the Top evaluation 
rubric expectations; struggling states seemed to suffer from political missteps or poor 
communication. In the midst of Race to the Top implementation, some states have 
changed academic standards and the state assessment, causing reporting on the impact of 
the grant to become challenging. Currently, a national report is not possible as the 
components selected across the states are not comparable.  
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Summary 
This chapter has examined the establishment of teacher salaries up to the recent 
efforts of the Obama administration to refine performance pay for teachers. The desire to 
reward teachers can be found in the various incentive programs but the theme is 
consistent: public and policy makers have a desire to recognize and reward quality 
teachers who have a positive impact on student achievement. The problem education 
faces is the ability to accurately link performance pay, teacher evaluation, and student 
achievement. The question remains, “After all the changes and funds to provide 
performance pay for teachers, does this have a positive impact on student achievement?” 
The research conducted in CVSD represents an attempt to answer the question for a 
single school district in Arizona.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGY 
This study examined the achievement levels of students whose teachers received 
performance pay compared to those teachers not receiving performance pay during the 
2012-2013 school year. In addition, the study analyzed if a relationship existed between 
student achievement and teacher evaluation. A single school district was selected for the 
study because the components for performance pay programs and teacher evaluation 
instruments across Arizona are vastly different. By selecting the single school district, 
teachers are held to the same requirements within the performance pay program and were 
evaluated utilizing the same measurement instrument.  
Since 2008, the CVSD performance pay program pays teachers based on their 
teacher evaluation scores and their student achievement outcomes. Initially, participation 
in the district performance pay program was voluntary for teachers. In 2012-2013, the 
district of 490 teachers had 167 teachers receiving performance pay, whereas the other 
323 teachers were no longer eligible due to legislative changes to the performance pay 
program. This created a unique population for the district, principals, teachers, and the 
superintendent who began to ask if students of teachers receiving performance pay had 
higher test scores than those unable to receive performance pay. Additionally, the district 
wanted to determine the relationship between student achievement, teacher evaluation, 
and performance pay. The following questions guided this quantitative study.  
Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference between the proficiency 
levels of students on state achievement tests for teachers 
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receiving performance pay when compared to teachers who 
do not receive performance pay? 
Research Question 2: Is there a significant relationship between teacher 
evaluation scores and student achievement scores on state 
achievement tests?  
Cardinal Valley School District 
CVSD is located in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan area. The district operates 
12 schools serving preschool through eighth grade. According to the Arizona A-F school 
rating system implemented in 2010-2011 by the state of Arizona, in 2012-2013, CVSD 
had one school rated A, eight schools rated B, three were rated with C, and the overall 
district grade was a B.  During the 2012-2013 school year, the district had a total of 490 
certified teachers with an average of 9.9 years of teaching experience.  
Table 3 demonstrates the student demographic profile for CVSD, and Table 4 
displays additional subgroup population data. The majority of students (70%) in CVSD 
are Hispanic. White students represent only 16% of the overall student population. A 
majority of students in CVSD (65%) qualify for free or reduced lunch and 11% of the 
students are English Language Learners.  
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Table 3 
CVSD Student Demographic Data Population K-8 2012-2013 
 
 Hispanic White 
African 
American Asian 
American 
Indian-
Alaskan 
Native 
Two or 
more 
N = 10, 118 7,083 1,619 809 202 101 304 
Percentage  70% 16% 8% 2% 1% 3% 
 
 
Table 4 
Additional Subgroup Student Population Data K-8 2012-2013 
 
 
Free and 
reduced lunch 
English 
Language 
Learners 
Special 
Education 
Gifted and 
Talented 
n = 10, 118 6,577 1,121 1,184 634 
Percentage 65% 11% 12% 6% 
 
Description of the Sample 
A comprehensive list of all certified employees was provided by the Human 
Resources Department of the school district that included the school site, subjects and 
grade levels taught, and total years of teaching experience. The majority of teachers (241) 
in the district taught Grades 3 through 8 and administered the state assessment. For the 
purpose of the study, the 490 teachers were further classified and defined as described in 
Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Teacher Classification 
 
Classification  Definition Number of teachers 
Teacher K-2 Certified teacher for grades kindergarten to second grade  n = 95 
Teacher 3-8 Certified teacher for grades third to eighth who administer 
the standardized state assessment 
n = 241 
Instructional 
Support 
Certified teachers represent additional teacher leadership 
or instructional support for classroom teachers (for 
example, instructional coaches, instructional 
interventionist, or special education resource teachers) 
n = 108 
Special Area Certified teachers of subjects such as physical education, 
arts, or music 
n = 46 
Total  N = 490 
 
 
The sample for the research only included those teachers with the classification of 
Teachers 3 through 8 for a total of 241 participants. This classification allowed the state 
standardized student achievement data to be linked to the instruction of the certified 
teacher in the classroom with students. Once the teacher information was collected from 
human resources, student achievement results on the state standardized reading test were 
obtained for Grades 3 through 8 from the district’s Research and Evaluation Department. 
The state standardized student achievement results were obtained for students of the 
selected teachers, including their mean-scaled scores and proficiency levels. In addition 
to student achievement data, teacher evaluation scores were obtained from the Human 
Resources Department of the school district. Teacher evaluation scores for the district 
were collected for six distinct learning targets based on a rubric designed to help teachers 
33 
improve their instructional practice. The teacher evaluation rubrics and applicable point 
allocations are detailed in Table 6.  
Table 6 
Teacher Evaluation Rubrics and Scores  
 
Rubric 
name 
Lesson 
content 
Lesson 
facilitation 
Student 
engagement 
Learning 
climate 
Instructional 
planning 
Student 
academic 
progress 
Total 
evaluation 
points 
Points 
possible 
5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 5.0 31.0 
 
 
Both principals and assistant principals conducted teacher evaluations two times 
during the school year for the school district. The final evaluation points represent the 
second evaluation of instructional practice. Student achievement data, teacher evaluation 
scores, and performance pay indication was then combined into one database for detailed 
analysis.  
Research Design 
The research was designed to determine differences between the achievement 
levels of students whose teachers did or did not receive performance pay, while also 
examining the relationship between student achievement and teacher evaluation. The 
groups included in the research were classroom teachers not receiving performance pay 
and the teachers awarded performance pay. The research design utilized was a correlation 
research due to the number of variables to be compared. A correlational research design 
is useful to researchers who are interested in determining to what degree two variables 
are related; however, correlational research does not “prove a relationship; rather, it 
indicates an association between two or more variables” (Creswell, 2008). The district 
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had an assumption that the teachers receiving performance pay within the district had 
higher levels of student achievement and higher teacher evaluation scores.  
The state standardized assessment used to demonstrate reading proficiency for 
teachers was the AIMS (Arizona Instrument to Measure Standards). The AIMS test is a 
criterion-referenced assessment with embedded norm-referenced items that is 
administered annually in April to all students enrolled in Arizona public schools. Reading 
was selected as the subject for the research because all third through eighth grade 
teachers are assessed by the state standardized reading test. For the purpose of the study, 
reading results for the 2012-2013 school year were evaluated in terms of reaching 
proficiency and differences in scale score results by May 2013. Reading proficiency for 
the research was defined as a student reaching passing on the assessment administered. 
Each grade level has different scales for their reading assessment, but each of these scales 
has a cut point to indicate passing the assessment. For this research, any student reaching 
the passing point for his or her appropriate grade level assessment was considered 
proficient on the reading assessment. Math was not selected for analysis during the 2012-
2013 school year as CVSD implemented a new curriculum and this would have had an 
impact on student scores.  
Variables 
For this study, the independent variable was if teachers were or were not awarded 
performance pay during the 2012-2013 school year. The dependent variables for the 
study were the mean of students reaching reading proficiency on state assessments and 
individual teacher evaluation scores. The list of classroom teachers was labeled as either 
having received performance pay or not receiving performance pay. As seen in Table 7, 
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for 2012-2013, 153 classroom teachers did not receive performance pay and 88 
classroom teachers were awarded performance pay.  
Table 7 
Classification of Teachers and Performance Pay 
 
Grade 
No  
 
Awarded  
Performance Pay 
Yes  
 
Awarded  
Performance Pay 
Total 
3rd  19 17 36 
4th  26 13 39 
5th  27 12 39 
6th  22 16 38 
7th  33 16 49 
8th  26 14 40 
Total teachers:  
Grades 3-8 153 88 241 
 
 
The average years of teaching experience for classroom teachers awarded incentive pay 
was 10.9 with the average of teachers not receiving incentive pay was 8.5.  
Data Analysis 
The data analysis utilized for the study was the two-sample independent t test. 
Glass and Hopkins (1970) found t test useful when comparing the mean differences 
between independent groups and allowing justification for the conclusion that the 
difference did not occur by random chance alone.  The purpose of the two-sample t test 
was to understand if there was an interaction between the independent variables (awarded 
performance pay “yes” or “no”) on the dependent variables (student achievement scores 
and teacher evaluation scores) for this research study. The following questions guided the 
data analysis of the research: 
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Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference between the proficiency 
levels of students on state achievement tests for teachers 
receiving performance pay when compared to teachers who 
do not receive performance pay? 
Research Question 2: Is there a significant relationship between teacher 
evaluation scores and student achievement scores on state 
achievement tests?  
Assumptions 
Each statistical test performed has a set of assumptions that needs to be outlined 
before any analysis can be conducted. The t test assumes the samples have close or equal 
variance. To determine if the variances between the two samples are equal, Glass and 
Hopkins (1970) demonstrated the use of the Levene Test for homogeneity of variances 
that will determine if the populations have equal or unequal variances. “If a random 
sample of persons receives a special treatment and a second independent sample does not, 
the two results means are said to be independent” (p. 284). If the samples have equal 
variances, the t test will justify the conclusion that the difference did not occur by random 
chance alone.  
Instruments 
The research included the reading achievement data for teachers with students in 
third through eighth grade during the 2012-2013 school year in CVSD. The reading 
assessment utilized for the teachers was the AIMS reading test for students in third 
through eighth grade. In 2012-2013, AIMS was a dual purpose assessment containing 
both criterion-referenced and norm-referenced test items designed to assess student 
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mastery of Arizona state instructional standards. AIMS is administered annually in April 
to all students in Grades 3 through 8 in reading and math. The AIMS test is used as high 
school exit criteria; all students in Arizona in 10th grade must pass the reading and math 
portions to graduate. The AIMS test is also utilized for state accountability purposes 
including the labeling of schools in the new A-F school accountability model. AIMS 
reading and math were administered during April of 2012-2013 to all students in Grades 
3 through 8 enrolled in CVSD. The Arizona standardized AIMS test categorizes students 
within four outcomes in reading for Grades 3 through 8. The Arizona Department of 
Education defines outcomes on the AIMS Reading assessment using the following labels: 
 Exceeds the Standard: Students who score at this level illustrate a superior 
academic performance as evidenced by performing substantially beyond the 
achievement goal for all students. 
 Meets the Standard: Students who score at this level demonstrate a solid academic 
performance on subject matter. 
 Approaches the Standard: Students who score at this level show partial 
understanding of the knowledge and application of the skills that are fundamental 
for proficient work. 
 Falls Far Below the Standard: Students who score at this level may have 
significant gains and limited knowledge and skills that are necessary to 
satisfactorily meet the state’s reading standard.  
Students categorized as Exceeds the Standard and Meets the Standard are 
considered as having passed the AIMS test. The AIMS reading test has clear definitions 
of reading proficiency for students and is administered to all students in the state of 
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Arizona, and for these reasons, it was selected for use in this study. The AIMS math test 
was not considered for part of the research because the math standards had recently 
changed and instruction in CVSD for math was on the new standards. In 2012-2013, an 
alignment in math instruction and the state math assessment was not possible and 
therefore the data was not included.  
A committee of teachers, district, and school site administrators with the help of a 
national consulting firm designed the teacher evaluation document utilized by CVSD. 
The teacher evaluation document has remained unchanged since it was created in the year 
2005-2006. Annually CVSD reviews teacher evaluation data and professional 
development is provided for all leadership specifically for inter-rater reliability. Annually 
each administrator must attend Qualified Evaluator training to ensure understanding and 
consistent use of the teacher evaluation documentation.  
This chapter detailed the sample and methods used for this quantitative study 
analyzing the proficiency levels of students on achievement tests for teachers receiving 
performance pay when compared to teachers who do not receive performance pay. The 
following chapter presents the results of the analysis of the data. 
39 
CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
This chapter reports the findings of this study that examined the achievement 
levels of students whose teachers received performance pay compared to those teachers 
not receiving performance pay during the 2012-2013 school year. In addition, the study 
analyzed data to determine if a relationship existed between student achievement results 
and teacher evaluation scores. The following research questions guided this investigation.  
Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference between the proficiency 
levels of students on state achievement tests for teachers 
receiving performance pay when compared to teachers who 
do not receive performance pay? 
Research Question 2: Is there a significant relationship between teacher 
evaluation scores and student achievement scores on state 
achievement tests?  
Sample and Data 
For 2012-2013, 153 classroom teachers did not receive performance pay and 88 
classroom teachers had been awarded performance pay. Of these teachers, 115 
represented teaching third through fifth grade, and 126 taught sixth through eighth grade 
for a total of 241 teachers included in the analysis (see Table 8).  
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Table 8 
Grade Level Groups of Teachers and Performance Pay 
 
Grade 
No 
Performance Pay 
Yes 
Performance Pay Total 
3rd-5th  73 42 115 
6th -8th  80 46 126 
Total teachers: 
Grades 3-8 153 88 241 
 
Teacher evaluation scores and student achievement scores in reading on the Arizona 
Instrument to Measure Standards (AIMS) state assessment were collected and analyzed 
for each of the 241 teachers included in the study. Data analysis was conducted on 
reading achievement student scores, including the percentage for passing AIMS reading, 
reading growth, and teacher evaluation scores utilizing the Statistical Program for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS). Analysis included correlation, Levene’s test, and t tests to 
determine the statistical significance of the findings.  
Results  
Research Question 1 
An independent samples t test was conducted to compare the achievement scores 
for teachers awarded performance pay with those teachers not awarded performance pay. 
The independent variable was performance pay “yes” or “no” and the dependent 
variables were AIMS reading achievement scores and teacher evaluation scores. The first 
research question asked, Is there a significant difference between the proficiency levels of 
students on state achievement tests for teachers receiving performance pay when 
compared to teachers who do not receive performance pay? 
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A t test analysis was conducted for teachers awarded performance pay, “yes” or 
“no,” along with the percentage passing the AIMS reading test. The results were t(234) = 
2.92, p = .004 (two-tailed) in scores for Performance Pay “Yes” (M = 80.1, SD = 10.1) 
and Performance Pay “No” (M = 75.3, SD = 15.3), with a mean difference of 4.78 and a 
95% confidence interval of 1.19 to 8.37. The Levene’s test of .06 signifies equal 
variances and based on the p = .004, there was a statistically significant difference 
between the percentages of the passing scores for AIMS reading of those teachers who 
did receive performance pay when compared with those teachers who did not receive 
performance pay. Table 9 displays the mean percentage of students passing the AIMS 
reading test for teachers awarded performance pay compared to teachers not receiving 
performance pay, followed by Figure 3, which is a graphic representation of the data.  
Table 9 
Percentage of Means for Passing AIMS Reading Comparison 
 
  
Count 
Percentage of means  
passing AIMS Reading 
Standard 
Deviation 
Performance Pay Yes  88 80.1 10.1 
Performance Pay No  153 75.3 15.3 
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Figure 3. Percentage of means for passing AIMS reading tests 
by performance pay categories 
 
 
An additional t test was conducted to determine if there was a statistically significant 
difference in the AIMS reading growth scores. AIMS growth is calculated annually by 
the Arizona Department of Education (ADE), Research and Evaluation Department. 
Growth as calculated by ADE is modeled after the Colorado growth model and the 
research conducted by Damian Betebenner (2011) who stated, 
The primary thrust of growth analyses over the last decade has been to determine, 
using sophisticated statistical techniques, the amount of student progress/growth 
that can be justifiably attributed to the school or teacher—that is, to disentangle 
current aggregate level achievement from effectiveness. (p. 1) 
Following the research conducted by Damian Betebenner, the ADE technical manual 
annually calculates student growth scores for reading and math using quantile regression 
to establish curvi-liner functional relationships between students’ prior year and current 
year scores (Huppenthal, 2013). This calculation allows school districts another measure 
of student achievement along with measuring the amount of students passing the state 
assessment.  
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Teachers receiving performance pay were then compared with those teachers not 
receiving performance pay to determine if a difference existed between student growth 
scores. An independent t test failed to reveal a statistically reliable difference between the 
AIMS reading growth scores for teachers performance pay “yes” (M = 52.9, SD = 9.1) 
and performance pay “no” (M = 51.3, SD = 9.2), a mean difference of 1.58, t(239) = 1.29, 
p = .200 (two-tailed). The Levene’s test result of .72 represents equal variances; and with 
a p = .20; there was not a statistically significant difference between the AIMS reading 
growth scores for teachers awarded performance pay when compared to those not 
awarded performance pay. Table 10 displays the number of teachers in each category of 
performance pay, either “yes” or “no,” and their mean AIMS growth score and the 
standard deviation. Figure 4 is a graphical representation of each teacher population and 
their mean AIMS reading growth score.  
Table 10 
Means for AIMS Reading Growth Score Comparison 
 
 
Count 
Means for AIMS  
reading growth scores 
Standard  
deviation 
Performance Pay Yes  88 52.9 9.1 
Performance Pay No  153 51.3 9.2 
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Figure 4. Means for AIMS reading growth scores by performance pay categories 
 
Further data analysis was conducted on the teacher groups. The results for the first 
group of teachers, those who taught third through fifth grades, and either did or did not 
receive performance pay are reported below. The results for the third through the fifth 
group with scores for the third through fifth grade teachers receiving performance pay 
demonstrated a statistically significant difference between the percentage passing AIMS 
reading for teachers in Grades 3 through 5 who received performance pay (M = 78.2, SD 
= 10.8) and the third through fifth grade teachers not receiving performance pay (M = 
70.1, SD = 14.8), a mean difference of 4.78, t(106) = 3.36, p = .001 (two-tailed). The 
same analysis was conducted on the group of teachers who taught Grades 6 through 8 and 
either were or were not awarded performance pay. The t(122) n = .83, p = .406 (two-
tailed) with scores for sixth through eighth grade teachers awarded performance pay (M = 
45 
81.7, SD = 9.1) and those teachers of sixth through eighth grades not awarded 
performance pay (M = 80.0, SD =14.1) showed a mean difference of 1.7 with a 95% 
confidence interval of –2.37 to 5.84. A Levene’s test result of .51 assumes variances are 
equal. A p = .406 showed there was not a statistically significant difference between the 
percentages for passing scores in reading for teachers in Grades 6 through 8 who either 
received performance pay or did not receive performance pay. Table 11 displays the 
number of teachers in each grade level grouping, their mean AIMS reading percentages 
for the AIMS reading passing scores, and the standard deviation. Figure 5 visually 
displays the difference in the percentages of the means for the AIMS reading scores for 
both third through fifth and the sixth through eighth grade level groups.  
Table 11 
Percentage of Means for Passing AIMS Reading by Grade Level Groups Comparison 
 
Count 
Percentage of means 
passing AIMS reading 
Standard 
deviation 
3rd-5th Performance Pay Yes  42 78.2 10.8 
3rd-5th Performance Pay No 73 70.1 14.8 
6th-8th Performance Pay Yes  46 81.7 9.1 
6th-8th Performance Pay No 80 80.0 14.1 
46 
 
Figure 5. Percentage of means for passing AIMS reading by grade-level groups 
 
Further analysis was conducted on each of the grade level groups to determine if 
there was a statistically significant difference between the grade level groups and the 
AIMS reading growth scores for the teachers in the different performance pay categories. 
For teachers in third through fifth grade, when comparing their AIMS reading growth 
scores, a statistically significant difference was not demonstrated. Teachers in Grades 3 
through 5 awarded performance pay had AIMS reading growth scores of (M = 50.5, SD = 
10.5); whereas, teachers in Grades 3 through 5 not awarded performance pay had AIMS 
reading growth scores of (M = 46.9, SD = 9.5). This represented a mean difference of 
3.60 and a 95% confidence interval of –.212 to 7.42, t(113) = 1.87, p = .064 (two-tailed). 
The Levene’s test result of .326 with p = .064 indicated there was not a statistically 
significant difference between the AIMS reading growth scores for teachers in Grades 3 
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through 5 who were either awarded performance pay or not during the 2012-2013 school 
year.  
The second grade level grouping of sixth through eighth grade was also compared 
by both performance pay categories and their AIMS reading growth achievement data. 
AIMS reading growth scores for sixth through eighth grade performance pay recipients 
(M = 55.1, SD = 6.9) and sixth through eighth grade not performance pay recipients (M = 
55.3, SD = 6.8) a mean difference of –.26 with a confidence interval of –2.78 to 2.26, 
t(124)= –.2, p = .838(two-tailed) Levene’s test resulted in .939. This represented that a 
statistically significant difference did not exist in the AIMS reading growth scores for 
teachers in Grades 6 through 8 in either performance pay category. Table 12 displays the 
grade level group count of teachers, mean AIMS reading growth score, and standard 
deviation, followed by Figure 6 which displays the mean AIMS reading growth score for 
each of the grade levels and performance pay categories.  
Table 12 
Mean AIMS Reading Growth Score by Grade Level Groups Comparison 
 
 
Count 
Percentage of means 
for AIMS  
reading growth scores 
Standard 
deviation 
3rd-5th Performance Pay Yes  42 50.5 10.6 
3rd-5th Performance Pay No 73 46.9 9.6 
6th-8th Performance Pay Yes  46 55.1 6.9 
6th-8th Performance Pay No 80 55.3 6.8 
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Figure 6. Percentage of means for AIMS reading growth scores by grade-level groups 
 
Research Question 2 
The second research question that guided this research asked, Is there a 
statistically significant relationship between teacher evaluation scores and student 
achievement scores on state achievement tests? In order to determine if a relationship 
existed between teacher evaluation scores and student achievement the Pearson 
Correlation was conducted using SPSS.  
Teacher total evaluation scores and the percentage passing AIMS reading were 
evaluated; the results indicated there was no correlation r = .124, n = 241, p = .055. The 
second analysis was to see if a relationship existed between total teacher evaluation 
scores and AIMS reading growth scores. The Pearson results between teacher evaluation 
scores and AIMS reading growth scores, although slightly higher than the percentage 
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passing AIMS reading, also demonstrated there was no correlation, r = .164, n = 241, p = 
.011.  
Further analysis was conducted on the specific rubrics in the teacher evaluation 
report. These rubrics included lesson content lesson facilitation, student engagement, 
learning climate, instructional planning, and student academic progress. All rubrics were 
worth five average points, except instructional planning, which was worth six points, for 
a total of 31 points possible for the complete teacher evaluation score. Pearson’s 
correlation was completed on all rubrics of the teacher evaluation for both percentages 
passing AIMS reading and AIMS reading growth scores. The results indicated a very 
weak correlation between learning climate and AIMS reading growth scores, r = .207, n 
= 241, p = .001. Student engagement also showed a very weak correlation with AIMS 
reading growth scores, r = .189, n = 241, p = .003. Lesson content, lesson facilitation, 
instructional planning, and student academic progress did not have correlations with 
either AIMS reading passing or AIMS reading growth. Each of the correlation results are 
detailed in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Correlation Results for Teacher Evaluation Rubrics and Percentage of Passing AIMS 
Reading and Growth Scores 
 
 
Lesson 
content 
Lesson 
facili- 
tation 
Student 
engage- 
ment 
Learning 
climate 
Instruct-
ional 
planning 
Student 
academic 
progress 
Total 
Eval-
uation 
Points 
AIMS percent 
passing, n = 241 
r =.117 
p =.069 
r = .122 
p = .058 
r = .107 
p = .099 
r =.173 
p = .007 
r =.055 
p = .391 
r =.102 
p =.116 
r = .124 
p = .055 
AIMS growth, 
n = 241 
r =.130 
p = .045 
r = .155 
p = .016 
r = .189 
p = .003 
r = .207 
p = .001 
r = .044 
p = .497 
r =.180 
p =.497 
r = .164 
p = .011 
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Overall, the correlation was higher for AIMS reading growth scores and teacher 
evaluation rubrics when compared to the percentages for AIMS passing scores, with the 
exception of the instructional planning rubric. Results indicated a lack of correlation 
between teacher evaluations and rubric scores and students performance on AIMS 
reading in both passing percentages and growth calculations.  
Summary 
Based on the analysis conducted, there was a statistically significant difference on 
the percentage of students passing the AIMS in reading for teachers who did receive 
performance pay, especially for teachers in Grades 3 through 5. Teachers’ reading growth 
scores were not statistically significant for teachers awarded performance pay. Scores for 
teachers sixth through eighth grades for percentages on passing reading and reading 
growth were not found to be statistically significant for those teachers awarded 
performance pay. Additional data analysis conducted found no correlation between 
overall teacher evaluation scores and percentages on passing reading or growth scores. A 
very weak correlation was found within the specific teacher evaluation rubrics of student 
engagement and learning climate with AIMS reading growth scores. Correlations were 
not found between the percentage of students passing on reading AIMS and any portion 
of the teacher evaluation. Chapter 5 provides a discussion and interpretation of the data 
including recommendations for future research.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents a summary of the important findings and conclusions drawn 
from the data presented in Chapter 4. Recommendations for further research are also 
discussed. Changing the existing structure to pay teachers has been the focus for reform 
efforts over the last 30 years. Teacher salary expenditures represent the majority of 
budget allocations for school districts, yet simply paying teachers for years of service and 
education has not yielded higher achievement scores. Performance pay has been viewed 
as an option to change the structure of teacher compensation with a desired outcome of 
increased student achievement scores. Arizona, along with 11 other states, was the 
recipient of Race to the Top funding in 2010 that required school districts to incorporate 
student achievement data into teacher evaluations to ultimately award highly effective 
teachers with performance pay. This research sought to determine if a relationship existed 
in Cardinal Valley School District’s current performance pay program between student 
achievement, teacher evaluation scores, and performance pay.  
Summary of the Study  
Arizona has changed the components required in teacher evaluations, and districts 
must now include student achievement outcomes when labeling teachers as effective or 
ineffective. The inclusion of data and labels of teacher performance are projected to be 
tied to performance pay by the 2015-2016 school year. School districts all over the state 
are allowed to develop their own models for the inclusion of data in teacher evaluations.  
CVSD is a K through eighth grade urban school district located in Phoenix, 
Arizona, with 10,118 students enrolled during the 2012-2013 school year. Since 2008, 
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CVSD has had a performance pay program that has awarded the performance of teachers 
based on their evaluation scores and their student achievement scores. The district was 
faced with two distinct populations of teachers: teachers awarded performance pay and 
teachers not awarded performance pay.  
During the 2012-2013 school year, the school district employed a total of 490 
teachers. Of the entire population, the sample was refined to 241 teachers in Grades 3 
through 8, because these teachers had state reading assessment data that could be directly 
tied to their classroom instruction. In addition to gathering student-level state reading 
assessment data for these teachers, their 2012-2013 teacher evaluation scores were 
collected. The following research questions guided this research:  
Research Question 1: Is there a significant difference between the proficiency 
levels of students on state achievement tests for teachers 
receiving performance pay when compared to teachers who 
do not receive performance pay? 
Research Question 2: Is there a significant relationship between teacher 
evaluation scores and student achievement scores on state 
achievement tests?  
The district wanted to determine if their existing performance pay program 
actually produced higher student achievement; and if indeed it did, this framework could 
be used to meet the new requirements for the state of Arizona.  Teachers were grouped 
into third through fifth grade and sixth through eighth grade levels to account for 
differences in reading instruction within the different grade levels. In order to examine if 
teachers who were awarded performance pay actually had higher student achievement 
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scores when compared to teachers not awarded performance pay, a two-sample 
independent t test was conducted on the percentage of students passing the AIMS reading 
test along with their reading growth scores. In addition, correlations were conducted on 
teacher evaluation scores and student achievement scores for both the percentage of the 
students who passed the AIMS reading test and for their reading growth scores. For 
teachers awarded performance pay compared to teachers not awarded performance pay in 
each of the grade-level groups, histograms were developed to demonstrate the mean 
percentage for those students passing the AIMS reading test along with their reading 
growth scores. Correlations were then competed and presented in tables for each 
component of the teacher evaluation rubric and for the percentage of those students 
passing the AIMS reading test along with their reading growth scores.  
Summary of Findings and Conclusions 
Performance Pay and Student Achievement 
The research conducted was focused on determining if awarding teachers 
performance pay actually increased student achievement. The following research 
question guided the research: Is there a significant difference between the proficiency 
levels of students on state achievement tests for teachers receiving performance pay when 
compared to teachers who do not receive performance pay? 
The first t test compared 88 teachers who were awarded performance pay and 153 
teachers who were not awarded performance pay by comparing the mean percentage of 
those students passing the AIMS reading test.  This first test yielded a p = .004, indicating 
there was a statistically significant difference between the percentage of students passing 
the AIMS reading test and the percentage of teachers receiving performance pay. 
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Teachers awarded performance pay had a mean score of 80.1% passing the AIMS 
reading test, and teachers not awarded performance pay had a mean score of 75.3% 
passing. When the same t test was conducted on the reading growth scores for AIMS, a 
p = .200 determined there was not a statistically significant difference in AIMS reading 
growth scores for teachers awarded performance pay when compared to teachers not 
awarded performance pay. The mean growth scores for teachers awarded performance 
pay was 52.9% and teachers not awarded performance pay had a mean growth score of 
51.3%. Although it was evident teachers receiving performance pay had a higher 
percentage of passing scores, this was not true of their growth scores. Growth scores are 
thought to be a better representation of the impact a teacher has during one year of 
instruction.  
In order to better understand the achievement results, a t test was then conducted 
on the grade level of the groups to determine if achievement results by grade levels were 
different for teachers who had received performance pay when compared to teachers not 
receiving performance pay. The results from the third through fifth grade group of 
teachers awarded performance pay did show a statistically significant difference 
(p =.001) in the percentage of students passing the AIMS reading test when compared 
with teachers in the third through fifth grade group not awarded performance pay. When 
the same analysis was conducted on teachers in Grades 6 through 8, either awarded 
performance pay or not, a p = .406 demonstrated a lack of statistically significant 
difference in the percentages of students passing the AIMS reading test. When the 
analysis was conducted to determine if teachers awarded performance pay had higher 
student growth scores on the AIMS reading test, the surprising results of a statistically 
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significant difference could not be found in either of the grade-level groups. Teachers in 
the third through fifth grade and sixth through eighth grade receiving performance pay 
did not have statistically significant higher growth scores.  
In summary, although an initial analysis demonstrated teachers awarded 
performance pay had higher percentages as to passing scores, further analysis showed 
only teachers in Grades 3 through 6 awarded performance pay demonstrated a higher 
percentage on passing scores. Reading growth scores were not higher for any teachers 
awarded performance pay when compared to teachers not awarded performance pay.  
Data Validity and Student Success  
The difference in percentages as to passing AIMS reading tests in Grades 3 
through 5 when compared to Grades 6 through 8 could be explained by the amount of 
time spent during the day on reading instruction. CVSD used a Response to Intervention 
(RtI) model for reading support. In this RtI model, students in kindergarten through fifth 
grades meet with teaching staff specifically trained in providing reading interventions for 
struggling readers, in addition to the 90-minute reading block. Although teachers in 
Grades 6 through 8 have a 90-minute language arts block (both reading and writing), for 
all other subjects teachers are expected to incorporate reading into their subject areas. For 
example, the math and social studies teachers are expected to incorporate reading 
standards into their instruction in their applicable subject areas. Although the time spent 
on reading instruction may have had a positive impact on Grades 3 through 5 as to the 
percentage of those passing reading, this was not seen at all for reading growth scores.  
In addition, models such as RtI and cross-departmental integration of standards 
create data tracking and validity questions. For example, if teachers of a third grade class 
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who receive performance pay and were provided more reading intervention time, how 
can it be determined if it was the success on the part of the teacher or on the part of the 
reading specialist? Additional data must be considered when calculating and linking 
student success to one teacher. Outside factors influencing student success could be 
whether students receive tutoring after school from another teacher, at home, or from a 
privately employed reading tutor.  
Another consideration with the difficulty of linking student success to one teacher 
is the professional learning environment found at CVSD. The school environment is 
designed to create a system of support for all students to find success. Teachers regularly 
collaborate on lessons, planning, and data analysis. It is a common practice for many 
teachers to interchange their students for targeted instruction in peers’ grade-level 
classrooms. For example, one teacher on a fourth-grade team of three teachers may take 
the group of students receiving the highest scores on the reading test; whereas another 
teacher will work with the students scoring the lowest on the most recent test. Teachers in 
CVSD regularly collaborate with their grade-level teams, instructional coaches, and 
reading interventionists to ensure student success. All of these additional inputs to student 
success must be considered before linking data to teachers.  
The results of the data analysis to determine if teachers awarded performance pay 
had higher student achievement conducted for CVSD were similar to results found in the 
Denver ProComp model. The ProComp model introduced value added student growth 
data to create a better analysis of the impact on one year of teaching. A report on the 
impact of ProComp by Goldhaber and Walch (2012) found in general increased 
achievement during ProComp, but inconsistent results were found across grade levels and 
57 
subjects. The results found in CVSD were similar to the analysis of ProComp, with 
results for third through fifth grade teachers higher than teachers in the sixth through 
eighth grades. Challenges described with ProComp could also be found in CVSD, 
including how to account for additional variables impacting student achievement, 
including class-size, student mobility during the school year, and class distribution of 
special needs students. All these variables must be researched to determine the impact on 
student achievement before linking performance pay to individual teachers.  
Teacher Evaluation Scores and Student Achievement 
The second research question sought to determine if a relationship existed 
between student achievement and teacher evaluation scores. The results and implications 
are discussed in the remainder of this chapter. The new Arizona framework requires the 
inclusion of student achievement data along with teacher evaluation scores to create a 
comprehensive profile used to label teachers. The second research question guided this 
scenario: Is there a significant relationship between teacher evaluation scores and 
student achievement scores on state achievement tests? 
A Pearson correlation was conducted on overall percentages of passing AIMS 
reading tests, AIMS reading growth scores, and overall teacher evaluation scores. When 
data analysis was conducted, a result of r =.124 indicated no correlation between 
percentages on AIMS reading tests and overall teacher evaluation scores. When 
comparing AIMS reading growth scores and teacher evaluation scores, a correlation still 
did not exist, although the r =.164 was slightly higher than the percentage for passing. 
This was a surprising outcome in the data analysis as it was assumed student achievement 
would be correlated with teacher evaluation performance data.  
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Further analysis sought to determine if a relationship existed between the 
individual rubrics on the teacher evaluation and student achievement. The rubrics 
included lesson content, lesson facilitation, student engagement, learning climate, 
instructional planning, and student academic progress. After analysis was conducted on 
all the teacher evaluation rubrics, only student engagement (r = .189) and learning 
climate (r = .207) showed weak correlations with AIMS reading growth scores. AIMS 
reading growth also did not have a correlation with lesson content, lesson facilitation, 
instructional planning, or student academic progress. No correlation could be found with 
the percentages of the scores for passing AIMS and any of the teacher evaluation rubrics. 
The correlation between student engagement and the learning climate could indicate 
these factors have an impact on student growth. However, the lack of correlation of any 
teacher evaluation scores on the percentages of passing require additional data and 
research, especially given the current political trend to incorporate teacher evaluations 
and student achievement data.  
In order to determine why correlations do not exist in the research, the process of 
teacher evaluation must be considered. Teachers are observed and scored on the various 
rubrics twice during the school year. The observations are either conducted by site 
principal or assistant principal, and at some school sites they are completed by both 
administrators. The week the observation will take place is known to the teacher in 
advance in order to prepare, but the exact date is not known. The observation must 
include an uninterrupted lesson of a minimum of 45 minutes; after the observation is 
complete and notes are analyzed a score is produced.  
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The teacher observation scores represent only what was observed at that point in 
time and may not be representative of that teacher’s instruction on a daily basis. This 
creates what could be a skewed data point for the teacher if the lesson was outstanding; 
but if daily instruction were inadequate, the data could be inflated. If the lesson observed 
did not go as planned but daily instruction is impeccable, this could be a negatively 
skewed data point. This is one of the struggles facing educators and the use of teacher 
evaluation data could represent why a correlation does not exist in the data for CVSD.  
Recommendations for Practice  
The recommendations for practice are focused on the issue of data validity: how 
to correctly link student achievement success to teachers for the purpose of performance 
pay and how to improve the data collected for use in teacher evaluation. In order to 
correctly link student success for the purposes of performance pay, a comprehensive data 
tracking system would have to be implemented. Each group involved would have to track 
the students they serve, including grade levels, interventionists, and individual teachers. 
This would provide a better framework to link student success to individuals in the 
school.  
The teacher evaluation process needs to be refined to include multiple points of 
data collected throughout the year. These multiple observations would help create a 
comprehensive profile of classroom instruction and would be a better representation than 
one or two visits scored during the year. This revision to the teacher evaluation process 
would require teacher input and consideration and would require significant time from 
site administration. Teachers are sometimes nervous about being observed so to increase 
the observations throughout the year would require training and discussion with all 
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parties involved. In addition, site administration oftentimes struggle to complete the two 
required observations during the year, thus adding mandatory additional observations 
may not be possible. Consideration could be given to employing outside evaluators for 
additional observations, but then teachers may be concerned with an unknown outside 
evaluator.  
Neither of these solutions will be easy for a district to implement but data validity 
must be considered, especially when performance pay will be awarded. Awarding 
teachers for student success that is not actually attributed to their classroom instruction 
would be a misuse of the award of performance pay for student achievement. In addition, 
labeling a teacher effective on their teacher evaluation based on one classroom 
observation could also be a misrepresentation of data.  
As districts and states move forward with performance pay based on teacher 
evaluation and student achievement data, it is imperative the data included is valid and 
reliable. The data should be representative of multiple measures for teachers and students 
before performance pay should be awarded. In addition to ensuring valid data for teacher 
evaluation and student achievement data, inclusion on other types of successful 
performance pay for teachers must be considered.  
A successful model for awarding teachers performance pay could include the 
various types of performance pay, including knowledge-and-skills-based pay coupled 
with student growth and teacher evaluation scores accumulated over time. Several studies 
have found a small positive impact for both NBPTS and performance pay for student 
growth scores (Cavalluzzo, 2004; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Goldhaber, 2002; 
Harris & Sass, 2006; Steele, Hamilton, & Stecher, 2010). If teachers were awarded 
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performance pay for obtaining a NBPTS and additionally awarded performance pay 
based on student growth over multiple years, this combination could potentially produce 
higher student achievement over time; longitudinal research would need to be conducted 
on this topic.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Research in the areas of teacher evaluation, performance pay, and linking student 
achievement is still new and must be ongoing to ensure validity. Future research should 
include longitudinal studies of teacher evaluation scores and student achievement data. It 
is possible that looking at multiple years of data would provide a more accurate label for 
teachers than a single-year snapshot. For example, if a teacher has high student 
achievement scores and teacher evaluation scores consistently for three to five years, 
could they be labeled highly effective?  
Research needs to include the impact of changes in leadership at schools sites and 
how that could impact student achievement and teacher evaluation scores. It is possible to 
have lower or higher scores on a teacher evaluation with a different administrator. 
Analysis should be conducted to determine if the amount of the performance pay 
awarded has an impact on student achievement and teacher evaluation scores. For 
example, if the performance pay is $500 versus $5,000, is there a significant difference in 
student or teacher evaluation outcomes? Linking student achievement and teacher 
evaluation scores for the purposes of awarding performance pay must be conducted 
thoughtfully with integrity and valid data. Given all the money provided to education for 
the purpose of increasing student achievement, it is clear policy makers need to continue 
to research best practices in this emerging field. Teachers do not enter the profession with 
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an expectation of earning a six figure salary; the desire to teach is an intrinsic motivator. 
Through continued research on how a teacher earns high achievement scores consistently 
over multiple years could provide the answers policy makers seek on how to extrinsically 
award teacher performance pay.  
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